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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW

New York Court of Appeals holds that criminal defendants bringing Rosario claims by way of CPL § 440.10 must demonstrate
that People's failure to deliver Rosario materials constituted actual prejudice
The "Rosario" discovery rule, codified in CPL section 240.45,1
requires prosecutors to provide defense counsel with any pre-trial
statements made by a prosecution witness relating to that witness's testimony in court, regardless of whether these statements
are inconsistent with the testimony.2 When the rule was first enunISee

N.Y. CPL § 240.45 (1)(a) (McKinney 1988); People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286, 289,
173 N.E.2d 881, 883, 213 N.Y.S.2d 448, 450, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 866 (1961). CPL § 240.45
requires mandatory disclosure of "[a]ny written or recorded statement... by any person
whom the prosecutor intends to call as a witness at trial and which relates to the subject
matter of the witness testimony." Id. The statute requires disclosure prior to the prosecutor's opening statement in a jury trial, and before other evidence is submitted in a non-jury
trial. Id. The defendant's counsel must reciprocate by disclosing to the prosecution any
prior out of court statements made by a defense witness, other than the defendant, that
relate to that witness's testimony. CPL § 240.45 (2)(a). Mandatory disclosure of Rosario
material is based upon "policy considerations" and a "right sense of justice." Rosario, 9
N.Y.2d at 289, 173 N.E.2d at 883, 213 N.Y.2d at 450; see also People v. Jones, 70 N.Y.2d
547, 550, 517 N.E.2d 865, 866, 523 N.Y.S.2d 53, 54 (1987); People v. Ranghelle, 69 N.Y.2d
56, 62, 503 N.E.2d 1011, 1015, 511 N.Y.S.2d 580, 584 (1986); People v. Perez, 65 N.Y.2d 154,
158, 480 N.E.2d 361, 363, 490 N.Y.S.2d 747, 749 (1985); People v. Ross, 21 N.Y.2d 258, 263,
234 N.E.2d 427, 430, 287 N.Y.S.2d 376, 380 (1967). A "right sense of justice" does not require that a criminal defendant be given a copy of the victim's personal version of the crime.
People v. Reedy, 70 N.Y.2d 826, 827, 517 N.E.2d 1324, 1325, 523 N.Y.S.2d 438, 439 (1987).
There are, however, two exceptions to the mandatory disclosure rule: (1) the defense
does not have an unrestricted right to inspect all documents held by a prosecutor, only
those that relate to the subject matter of the prosecution witness's testimony and do not
necessitate disclosure, People v. Poole, 48 N.Y.2d 144, 149, 397 N.E.2d 697, 700, 422
N.Y.S.2d 5, 8 (1979), and (2) the People need not turn over to the defense any statements
that are the "duplicative equivalents" of statements already delivered, People v. Consolazio,
40 N.Y.2d 446, 454, 354 N.E.2d 801, 806, 387 N.Y.S.2d 62, 66 (1976).
1 See Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d at 289, 173 N.E.2d at 883, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 450. In Rosario, the
Court of Appeals refused to limit the scope of the rule to only prior statements that were
actually inconsistent with trial testimony, because pre-trial statements of prosecution witnesses are valuable for purposes other than impeachment. Id. For example, "[t]hey may
reflect a witness's bias ... or ... supply the defendant with knowledge essential to the
neutralization of the damaging testimony of the witness which might, perhaps, turn the
scales in his favor." Id. As long as there exists a nexus between the statement and the
witness's testimony, and the statement is not protected by confidentiality, the People must
proffer the statement to the criminal defendant. Id.
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ciated,3 the prosecution's failure to deliver Rosario material entitled a convicted defendant to a reversal and a new trial if the defendant proved that the withholding constituted more than
harmless error.4 Subsequent judicial refinements to the Rosario
rule led to abandonment of the harmless error analysis 5 in favor of
3 See Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d at 289, 173 N.E.2d at 883, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 450. Prior to Rosario, New York law required that a trial judge initially make a determination as to whether
or not the prior statement actually contradicted the witness's testimony. See People v.
Walsh, 262 N.Y. 140, 149-50, 186 N.E. 422, 425 (1933) (emphasis added), overruled by Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286, 173 N.E.2d 881, 213 N.Y.S.2d 448 (1961). Once the trial judge was satisfied that an actual contradiction existed, it was at the judge's discretion whether or not the
statement should be delivered to the defendant. See id. Prior law never mandated delivery,
it merely permitted it. See Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d at 291, 173 N.E.2d at 884, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 452
(Froessel, J., concurring). Only that portion of the prior statement that the court felt contradicted the witness's trial testimony was given to the defendant. See People v. Bai, 7 N.Y.2d
152, 155, 164 N.E.2d 387, 389, 196 N.Y.S.2d 87, 89 (1959), overruled by Rosario 9 N.Y.2d
286, 173 N.E.2d 881, 213 N.Y.S.2d 448 (1961); see also Decisions, 28 BROOK. L. REV. 166,
167 (1961) ("[W]itness' prior statements which conflicted with his testimony.., might...
be partially released to the defense.").
The Rosario court was influenced by the Supreme Court's opinion in Jencks v. United
States, 353 U.S. 657, 668 (1957). See Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d at 289, 173 N.E.2d at 883, 213
N.Y.S.2d at 450. In Jencks, the Court held that the defendant should not be required to
show an actual conflict between the prosecution witness's prior statement and testimony,
because "the interest of the United States in a criminal prosecution 'is not that it shall win
a case, but that justice shall be done.'" Jencks, 353 U.S. at 668 (quoting Berger v. United
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)). The scope of the rule enunciated in the Jencks case was
clarified by the Jencks Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1957). Consequently, the Rosario rule is
now broader than the Jencks rule in two respects: first, under the Jencks rule, disclosure is
permitted only after the government's witness has testified on direct examination; second,
the Jencks rule is understood to permit judicial screening of prior statements to determine
their relevance to the subject matter of the witness's testimony. Act of September 2, 1957,
Pub. L. No. 85-269 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. (71 Stat.) 595.
" See Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d at 290-91, 173 N.E.2d at 883-84, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 451-52. A
defendant raising a Rosario claim was granted a reversal and new trial if "there was a rational possibility that the jury would have reached a different verdict [had] the defense...
been allowed the use of the witness's prior statements." Id. at 291, 173 N.E.2d at 884, 213
N.Y.S.2d at 451.
See Ranghelle, 69 N.Y.2d at 63, 503 N.E.2d at 1016, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 585. In Consolazio, 40 N.Y.2d at 454, 354 N.E.2d at 805, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 66, the Court of Appeals first
stated, in dicta, that the harmless error analysis would not be appropriate for Rosario
claims. The Consolazio court rejected the argument that a "consideration of the significance
of the content or substance of a witness's prior statements can result in a finding of harmless error." Id. The harmless error analysis had previously been considered necessary because of the prevalence of errors at trial and was applied to screen out those errors that
were merely harmless. See People v. Kingston, 8 N.Y.2d 384, 387, 171 N.E.2d 306, 308, 208
N.Y.S.2d 956, 959 (1960).
Harmless error analysis differs depending upon whether the error implicates constitutional or non-constitutional issues. See People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 239, 326 N.E.2d
787, 792, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213, 220 (1975). In determining whether a non-constitutional error is
harmless, the proper inquiry is whether "there is a significant probability, rather than only a
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the less speculative per se error rule.' Under the per se rule, a defendant successfully interposing a Rosario claim was entitled to an
automatic reversal and new trial. It appeared that there was no
distinction made as to whether the claim was raised on direct appeal8 or by way of a post-judgment motion to vacate pursuant CPL
section 440.10.9 Recently, however, in People v. Jackson,0 the New
rational possibility,... that the jury would have acquitted the defendant had it not been for
the error or errors which occurred." Id. at 242, 326 N.E.2d at 794, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 222.
Although Rosario involved non-constitutional error, see Jones, 70 N.Y.2d at 555, 517 N.E.2d
at 870, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 58 (Bellacosa, J., concurring) (referring to Rosario violations as involving non-constitutional issues), the Crimmins harmless error analysis was not applied in
Rosario, because Rosario was decided fourteen years prior to the articulation of the harmless error standard in Crimmins, see Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d at 239, 326 N.E.2d at 892, 367
N.Y.S.2d at 220 (stating that individual cases were more significant than "particular formulations of... a rule").
' See Ranghelle, 69 N.Y.2d at 64, 503 N.E.2d at 1016, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 585. In
Ranghelle, the court held that the failure to deliver Rosario material was per se reversible
error, thus entitling the defendant to a new trial. Id. Harmless error analysis was considered
inappropriate for application to Rosario claims because there was "no way, short of speculation, of determining how [the withheld material] might have been used or how its denial to
counsel might have damaged [the] defendant's case." Jones, 70 N.Y.2d at 552, 517 N.E.2d
at 868, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 56. This type of speculation would contravene the basis of Rosario.
See People v. Perez, 65 N.Y.2d 154, 160, 48 N.E.2d 361, 364, 490 N.Y.S.2d 747, 750-51
(1985) ("[A] judge's impartial determination as to what portions may be useful to the defense, is no substitute for the single-minded devotion of counsel for the accused.").
Regardless of the prosecution's intent, negligence, or inadvertence, failure to deliver
Rosario material constituted per se reversible error. Jones, 70 N.Y.2d at 553, 517 N.E.2d at
869, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 57. The per se error rule was applied only where the prosecution completely failed to disclose Rosario material to defense counsel. See Ranghelle, 69 N.Y.2d at
63, 503 N.E.2d at 1016, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 585. Where the prosecution merely delayed in its
delivery, the court inquired as to whether the delay constituted substantial prejudice. Id.
I See Jones, 70 N.Y.2d at 553, 517 N.E.2d at 869, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 57; Ranghelle, 69
N.Y.2d at 63, 503 N.E.2d at 1016, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 585; Perez, 65 N.Y.2d at 160, 480 N.E.2d
at 364, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 750; Consolazio, 40 N.Y.2d at 454, 354 N.E.2d at 805, 387 N.Y.S.2d
at 66. Although Jones, Ranghelle, Perez, and Consolazio each involved Rosario claims
brought on direct appeal, the Court of Appeals never indicated that the procedural mechanism was a factor in adopting the per se error rule. See Jones, 70 N.Y.2d at 552, 517 N.E.2d
at 868, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 56. Rather, the main reason for the rule was the inability of the
reviewing court to ascertain how the defense counsel would have used the material. Id.
8 See CPL arts. 450-70 (dealing with appeals).
9 See CPL § 440.10 (McKinney 1983). Section 440.10 represents New York's first codification of the common law writ of coram nobis. See HENRY B. ROTHBLATT, CRIMINAL LAW OF
NEW YORK: THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW § 437, at 337 (1971). At common law, a writ of
coram nobis allowed appellate courts to consider trial errors not appearing in the record.
John C. Corbett, Coram Nobis, 29 BROOK. BARR.147, 147 (1978). The effect of the writ was
to vacate the trial court's judgment. Thomas V. Dadey, Note, The Expanding Scope of
Coram Nobis, 13 SYRACUSE L. REv. 116, 117 (1962).
Section 440.10 outlines the various grounds upon which a motion to vacate will be
granted. See CPL § 440.10. Pursuant to § 440.10(1)(f), a judge may vacate a judgment on
the basis of "[i]mproper and prejudicial conduct not appearing in the record.., resulting in
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York Court of Appeals held that a defendant bringing a Rosario
claim on a CPL section 440.10(1)(f) motion must demonstrate a
prejudicial error,11 while indicating that a Rosario claim raised on
direct appeal would still enjoy the benefit of the per se error rule.12
In Jackson, the defendant, Erik Jackson, had been convicted
of six counts of felony murder and one count of second-degree arson.'3 Several years after his direct appeal had been exhausted,' 4
the defendant discovered that Rosario material had been withheld
from him at his trial eleven years earlier. 5 Because the defendant
had exhausted his direct appeal, his only recourse was to bring a
Rosario claim by way of a post judgment motion pursuant to secthe judgment which conduct, if it had appeared in the record, would have required a reversal of the judgment upon an appeal therefrom." CPL § 440.10(1)(f).
10 78 N.Y.2d 638, 585 N.E.2d 795, 578 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1991).
Id. at 649, 585 N.E.2d at 802, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 490. A defendant raising a Rosario
claim on a section 440.10(1)(f) motion "must demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the
failure to disclose the Rosario material contributed to the verdict." Id.
12Id. When a Rosario claim is the subject of both a direct appeal and a post-conviction
motion pursuant to CPL 440.10, the per se rule applies. Id.; People v. Cecora,
- A.D.2d
-,
587 N.Y.S.2d 748, 749 (2d Dep't 1992).
13 Jackson, 78 N.Y. 2d at 640, 585 N.E.2d at 796, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 484. The defendant's
conviction arose out of the highly publicized Waldbaum's supermarket fire in 1978. Id. Robert D. McFadden, State Appeals Court Narrows Right to a New Trial when Other Evidence is Upheld, N.Y. TiNras, Dec. 20, 1991, at B3. The Brooklyn fire resulted in the deaths
of six firefighters. Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 640, 585 N.E.2d at 796, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 484; McFadden, supra.
" Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 640, 585 N.E.2d at 796, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 484. In his 1985 appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the people had failed to meet the reasonable
doubt standard due to the insufficiency of the evidence. See People v. Jackson, 65 N.Y.2d
265, 270, 480 N.E.2d 727, 730, 491 N.Y.S.2d 138, 141 (1985). This complaint was based on
the conflicting testimony of the prosecution's two arson expert witnesses concerning the
cause of the fire. Id. at 268, 480 N.E.2d at 729, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 140. The court noted, that
when "two or more witnesses give conflicting testimony ... [it] simply creates a credibility
question for the jury." Id. at 272, 480 N.E.2d at 730, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 144. The court held
that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction, and that the conflict between
the arson experts' testimony was not substantial enough to conclude that the defendant's
conviction was based on "pure speculation." Id. at 273, 480 N.E.2d at 730, 491 N.Y.S.2d at
144 (quoting Curley v. United States, 160 F.2d 229, 233, cert. denied, 331 U.S. 837 (1947)).
Following this decision by the Court of Appeals, the defendant twice moved to vacate his
conviction pursuant to CPL § 440.10. Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 642, 585 N.E.2d at 797, 578
N.Y.S.2d at 485 (1991). The first motion was based on ineffective assistance of trial and
appellate counsel. Id. The second was the motion at issue in Jackson. Id.
11 See Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 640, 585 N.E.2d at 796, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 484. The material
that had been withheld consisted of a memorandum containing "a synopsis of an interview
with a fire marshal." Id. at 642, 585 N.E.2d at 797, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 485. The fire marshal,
who later testified against the defendant, had stated that the supermarket fire had not, in
his opinion, been the result of arson. William Kunstler, Perspective: Goodbye to 'Rosario',
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 10, 1992, at 2.
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tion 440.10(1)(f). 16 The trial court, rejecting the prosecution's argument that the defendant was required to demonstrate particularized prejudice, vacated the conviction."i The appellate division
affirmed.' 8
In reversing the appellate division's order, the Court of Appeals concluded that the "improper and prejudicial conduct" requirement of section 440.10(1)(f) necessitates a showing of actual
prejudice, even though the underlying claim is based on a Rosario
violation. 9 More specifically, in order to satisfy this burden, a defendant must demonstrate "a reasonable possibility that the failure to disclose the Rosario material contributed to the verdict."2 0
Writing for the court, Chief Judge Wachtler noted that this interpretation of section 440.10(1)(f) correctly effectuates the underlying legislative policy objectives, including society's interest in the
"finality of judgments.' Chief Judge Wachtler further stated that
the court, "[i]n originally adopting the per se error rule [with respect to Rosario claims brought on direct appeal], balanced the
rights of the defendant against the rights of society. ' 22 However,
Chief Judge Wachtler felt that this balancing did not control in
Jackson because societal interests and the statutory language of
section 440.10(1)(f) already prescribed the proper result. 23
16
17

See Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 640, 585 N.E.2d at 796, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 484.
Id. at 642, 585 N.E.2d at 797, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 486.

18 Id.

Id. at 647, 585 N.E.2d at 800, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 489.
0 Id. at 649, 585 N.E.2d at 802, 578 N.Y.2d at 490. In support of this standard the
Jackson court relied on the Rosario decision itself. Id. The Jackson court also stated that
because this standard is also used for Brady material, "there will now be a certain congruence in the treatment of Rosario and Brady claims raised by way of CPL 440.10 motions
after direct appeal has been exhausted." Id. Brady claims arise when the prosecutor was
made aware by a specific discovery request that the defendant considered the material important to the defense, yet fails to disclose the information. Id. In Jackson,the court further
noted that the Rosario rule standard would be the most equitable. Id. The court, although
stating that the Rosario rule is not based on constitutional grounds, failed to apply the
harmless error analysis for non-constitutional error articulated in People v. Crimmins, 36
N.Y.2d 230, 239, 326 N.E.2d 787, 792, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213, 220 (1975). See supra note 5 (discussing Crimmins non-constitutional harmless error analysis).
21Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 647, 585 N.E.2d at 801, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 489.
22 Id. at 641, 585 N.E.2d at 797, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
23 Id. at 645-47, 585 N.E.2d at 799-801, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 488-89. Under a writ of error
coram nobis, a common law remedy correcting a judgment on the ground of error of fact, a
defendant had to demonstrate prejudice. See id. at 646, 585 N.E.2d at 800, 578 N.Y.S.2d at
488. Courts mandated this in order to further "society's interest in the finality of judgments." Id. According to the Jackson court, the legislature carried over the prejudice requirement when it promulgated CPL § 440.10, which codified the common law remedy. See
"
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In a compelling dissent, Judge Titone criticized the court's use
of policy to alter a settled principle of law "when [its] consequences are, in the eyes of four members of th[e] Court, inconve'
Judge Titone further noted that the
nient or undesirable."24
court's undialy narrow construction of "prejudice

' 25

would effec-

tively promote, rather than deter prosecutorial misconduct.26 In
more than an
short, he viewed the majority's rationale as "nothing
27
exercise in result-directed statutory construction.

id. at 646-47, 585 N.E.2d at 800, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 488. Clearly, the legislature realized the
problems that would arise if a per se error rule was applied to claims brought under CPL §
440.10, since this section has no time limitations for filing. See id. If applied, defendants
would be entitled to a new trial years after the direct appeal was exhausted. See id. Inevitably, the state's ability to retry a defendant would be affected because evidence would be
lost, witnesses would no longer be available, and memories of the crime would be lost. See
id.
24 Id. at 650, 585 N.E.2d at 803, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 491 (Titone, J., dissenting). The dissent disagreed with the court's assertion that the per se error rule had been adopted as the
result of a balancing test. Id. at 651, 585 N.E.2d at 803, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 491-92. The dissent
stated that the actual reason for adopting the per se error rule was that " 'a judge's impartial determination as to what portions [of a witness's pretrial statements] may be useful to
the defense, is no substitute for the single-minded devotion of counsel for the accused.' "Id.
at 652, 585 N.E.2d at 804, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 492 (citing People v. Perez, 65 N.Y.2d 154, 160,
480 N.E.2d 361, 366, 491 N.Y.S.2d 747, 753 (1985)).
2 Id. at 653, 585 N.E.2d at 804, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 492 (Titone J., dissenting). The dissent
indicated that the term "prejudice" is laden with ambiguity throughout the CPL. Id. Judge
Titone asserted that sometimes errors in a trial are deemed prejudicial because they "either
detract from the process or impair the defendant's ability to present a defense." Id. at 654,
585 N.E.2d at 804, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 493 (Titone, J. dissenting).
For example, errors in the trial court's closing instructions that deprive the defendant of his right to jury consideration of the crime elements are deemed prejudicial "[n]o matter how conclusive the evidence." Similarly, errors affecting the
jury's deliberative process have been held prejudicial to the extent they tend to
"compromise" that process, without regard to the strength of the People's case."
at
Id. 653, 585 N.E.2d at 804, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 492-93 (Titone, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). The dissent further argued that in originally imposing a per se error rule on Rosario
claims, the court had determined that the failure to deliver Rosario material was always
intrinsically prejudicial. See id. "Indeed, if 'prejudice' had not been present in Jones,
Ranghelle, Perez, and Consolazio, [the court] would have been guilty of exceeding [its] powers as an appellate court," because section 470.05(1) requires that direct appeals be determined without regard to errors "which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties."
Id. at 654, 585 N.E.2d at 805, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 493 (Titone, J., dissenting).
28 Id. at 659, 585 N.E.2d at 808, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 496 (Titone, J., dissenting). Judge
Titone emphasized that under this standard, prosecutors have an incentive to postpone disclosure of Rosario material, discovered after trial, until after sentencing, so that a defendant's only remedy is to bring a Rosario claim under CPL § 440.10 because the defendant's
direct appeal is barred. Id. Judge Titone further contended that this directly conflicts with
Rosario's policy of prompt and full disclosure. Id.
27 Id. at 652, 585 N.E.2d at 804, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 492 (Titone, J., dissenting). According
to Judge Titone, the majority's rationale "simply does not withstand scrutiny." Id.
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It is suggested that the Court of Appeals engaged in an unwarranted construction of "improper and prejudicial conduct."2 By
failing to focus on the language of section 440.10(1)(f) in its entirety, the court incorrectly required a showing of actual prejudice
with respect to Rosario claims brought under section 440.10(1)(f).
As a result, defendants who are relegated to a section 440.10(1)(f)
motion because of a prosecutor's wrongful withholding of Rosario
material may be unfairly punished.
Irrespective of the court's construction," the plain language of
section 440.10(1)(f) provides guidance as to what kind of "improper and prejudicial conduct" is required before a motion to vacate may be granted." While the words of section 440.10(1)(f) do
not explicitly define "improper and prejudicial conduct," the statute specifically requires a vacatur of judgment where the conduct
would have resulted in a reversal had the claim been raised on direct appeal. 3 1 Thus, if the court applies the per se error rule to a
28 CPL § 440.10(1)(f).
29

See generally STATUTES § 76 (McKinney 1971) (providing rules on interpreting stat-

utes enacted by New York State legislature). There was no cause for the court to engage in
the construction of "improper and prejudicial," because by their very words, certain statutes
are free from ambiguity. Id. To interpret a statute that requires no interpretation is to
infringe upon the sphere of the legislature. See id.
The Jackson court claimed that its construction reflected a policy consideration underlying § 440.10(1)(f), namely, society's interest in the "finality of judgments." Jackson, 78
N.Y.2d at 646, 585 N.E.2d at 799, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 488. The case cited by the Jackson court
in support of this proposition involved a situation whereby the defendant neglected to bring
an appeal. See People v. Howard, 12 N.Y.2d 65, 66, 187 N.E.2d 113, 114, 236 N.Y.S.2d 39,
41 (1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 870 (1963). The court, in Howard, reasoned "that an application in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis is to be treated as an emergency measure
born of necessity to afford a defendant a remedy against injustice when no other avenue of
judicial relief is, or ever was, available to him." Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Howard
court weighed the societal interest "in putting an end to litigation" with the interest in
providing corrective measures for defendants, and concluded that the former should prevail.
Id. However, in Jackson, the defendant had no other recourse but to file a section 440.10
motion to vacate, unlike the defendant in Howard who neglected to file an appeal. Howard,
12 N.Y.2d at 66, 187 N.E.2d at 114, 236 N.Y.S.2d at 41; supra text accompanying note 16.
Therefore, it is asserted that under the Howard rationale, society's interest in finality of
judgments cannot prevail over a defendant's interest in having a corrective measure available, when as in Jackson, the defendant's only recourse is a section 440.10 motion. Id.
1oSee CPL § 440.10(1)(f).
21 Id.; see People v. D'Amico, 136 Misc. 2d 16, 28, 517 N.Y.S.2d 881, 890 (Oneida
County Ct. 1987), aff'd, 148 A.D.2d 982, 538 N.Y.S.2d 965 (4th Dep't 1989). In D'Amico, the
court did not attempt to determine whether "improper and prejudicial" required a showing
of actual prejudice. See id. Whether "improper and prejudicial" means only actual prejudice
or includes per se prejudice depends upon whether the underlying claim-in this case Rosario-requires a showing of actual prejudice when brought on direct appeal. Cf. id. (D'Amico
court understood § 440.10(1)(f) as requiring that definition of "improper and prejudicial" be
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Rosario claim raised on direct appeal, it should also apply the per
se error rule to a Rosario claim brought by way of a section
440.10(1)(f) motion, because the conduct giving rise to the claim is
the same in both situations. 32
The Jackson court's holding also contravenes a common purpose of both the Rosario rule and section 440.10, namely, curbing
prosecutorial misconduct.3 3 The decision assures prosecutors that
if they withhold precious Rosario material long enough, that is, until after direct appeals are exhausted, a defendant will not be enti34
tled to a vacatur unless the defendant can prove actual prejudice.
The court's disregard for the decision's probable impact on
prosecutorial misconduct is rooted in its antipathy toward the per
se error rule's application to Rosario claims in general 5 and specifsame as definition of "prejudice" on appeal).
32 See CPL § 440.10(1)(f). The D'Amico court saw no reason why a Rosario claim
brought on a section 440.10(1)(f) motion should be treated differently than a Rosario claim
raised on direct appeal. D'Amico, 136 Misc. 2d at 28, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 890. However, the
D'Amico court was compelled with great reluctance to follow Ranghelle which "preclude[d]
the application of the traditional 'prejudicial' analysis." Id. Therefore, the D'Amico court
determined that in order for the court to apply harmless error analysis to Rosario claims
brought on section 440.10 motions, a complete reversal of Ranghelle was essential. See id.
" See generally Barry Kamins, Holding the ProsecutorMore Accountable, An Increasing Trend, 39 BROOK. BARR. 129 (1988). (Rosario per se error rule reaffirmed in Jones serves
purpose of holding prosecutors accountable for their actions). The Rosario rule seeks to
promote fairness during pretrial discovery. See Governor's Memorandum on Approval of ch.
411, N.Y. Laws (July 5, 1979), reprintedin [1979] N.Y. Laws 1800 (McKinney) (codification
of Rosario rule will reduce "[tihe element of surprise . . .and it's inherent unfairness").
Additionally, the seminal case, Rosario, upon which the majority relies, states that it is a
"right sense of justice" which entitles a defendant access to a prosecution witness's prior
statements. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d at 289, 173 N.E.2d at 883, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 450; see also supra
note 1.
Section 440.10 provides a method of redress for unfairness which results from errors at
trial not appearing on the record. See CPL 440.10(2); see also People v. Harris, 109 A.D.2d
351, 353, 491 N.Y.S.2d 678, 682, (2d Dep't. 1985) (stating that § 440.10 motions are impermissible if defendant is able to take appeal). A post-conviction motion to vacate, such as
section 440.10, is an effective measure designed to curb the prosecutor who is not subject to
civil liability for acts committed in his prosecutorial capacity. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409, 427 (1976) (post-conviction collateral remedies insure that defendant receives fair
trial).
11 See Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 659, 585 N.E.2d at 808, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 496 (Titone J.,
dissenting). Since the timing of the disclosure is solely within the prosecutor's control, it is
unfair to base the outcome of the defendant's claim upon the whim of the prosecutor. See
id.; see also Kunstler, supra note 15, at 2 ("This one-sided approach . . .will result in
increased prosecutorial misconduct ....;').
11 See People v. Jones, 70 N.Y.2d 547, 553, 517 N.E.2d 865, 869, 523 N.Y.S.2d 53, 57
(1987) (Bellacosa, J., concurring) (referring to cases which adopted per se error rule as
"three errant footsteps"). But see People v. Young, 79 N.Y.2d 365, 371, 591 N.E.2d 1163,
1167, 582 N.Y.S.2d 977, 981 (1992). In Young, the court refused to apply a harmless error
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ically to section 440.10 post-judgment collateral attacks.3 6
By improperly construing the "improper and prejudicial" language of section 440.10(1)(f), the Jackson court subverted the common policies underlying both the Rosario rule and section 440.10.
The immediate effect of this "decision will be to make relief for
Rosario violations virtually unavailable in post-conviction proceedings, ' 37 while encouraging prosecutors who discover potential Rosario material to postpone disclosure until after direct appeals
have been exhausted. Although Jackson only affects Rosario
claims brought on a section 440.10 motion, this decision may signify the court's eventual overruling of the per se error rule with
respect to Rosario claims, regardless of the manner by which they
are raised.
Salvatore G. Gangemi

analysis to Rosario claims raised on direct appeal. Id. Writing for the court, Judge Titone
stated that "[tihe decision in Jackson, which was premised on the unique policy considerations related to the finality of criminal judgments, thus was not intended to signal a more
general retreat from the Court's ongoing 'commitment' to the.., per se rule of reversal." Id.
at 370-71, 591 N.E.2d at 1166, 582 N.Y.S.2d at 980.
"eSee CPL § 440.10 commentary at 319 (McKinney 1987). "The codification... [of the
common law coram nobis writ] has not fulfilled one of its hoped for missions, i.e. curtailment of post-judgment collateral proceedings in the State... courts." Id.
1 Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 651, 585 N.E.2d at 803, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 491 (Titone, J.,
dissenting).

